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I. INTRODUCTION
When Donna faced an unplanned pregnancy, she searched online for 
abortion services in her area.1 White Rose Women’s Center came up.2 
Thinking it was an abortion clinic, Donna called White Rose and asked how
much they charged for a first-trimester abortion.3 A White Rose representative 
told Donna they did not discuss pricing over the phone, but if she came into 
the clinic she would receive a pregnancy test and a sonogram for free.4 Donna
booked an appointment.5 During her twenty-minute sonogram, the nurse
repeatedly told Donna she “really need[ed] God in [her] life” and counselled 
Donna against abortion.6  When Donna tried to get up to leave, the nurse pushed
the sonogram device back onto her stomach.7 Donna had to physically remove 
the nurse’s hand from her stomach to leave.8 
The nurse called Donna a few days later apologizing and offering another 
sonogram.9 Equipped with a hidden camera, Donna returned to White Rose.10 
At the beginning of this visit, Donna had to watch a video discussing all 
potential risks of abortion, even the unlikely ones.11 The video alleged that
abortion can cause major depression, anxiety, substance abuse, and suicide.12 
Then, a counselor showed Donna a doll the size of a twelve-week-old fetus
and claimed Donna would face an increased risk of breast cancer if she 
received an abortion.13 At the end of Donna’s visit, a White Rose
1. Donna shared her story with VICE News, which only used her first name for privacy
reasons. VICE News, The Fake Abortion Clinics of America: Misconception, YOUTUBE (Sept. 17, 
2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g-ex4Q-z-is#action=share [https://perma.cc/ 
AN97-VUGC].
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Id.
 4.  Id.
 5.  Id.
 6.  Id.
 7.  Id.
 8.  Id.
 9.  Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.  The American Psychological Association maintains that women who terminate 
unwanted pregnancies do not suffer from any greater mental health issues than women 
who carry unwanted pregnancies to term.  BRENDA MAJOR ET AL., AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL 
ASS’N, MENTAL HEALTH AND ABORTION (2008), https://www.apa.org/pi/women/programs/
abortion/executive-summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/AP5Y-6A9L].
13. VICE News, supra note 1. Scientific research shows that abortion does not increase 
a woman’s risk of breast cancer. Organizations like the American College of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists “routinely review the evidence on this topic,” and they repeatedly conclude 
that abortion is not linked to breast cancer. Table 25: Abortion and Breast Cancer Risk, 
SUSAN G. KOMEN (July 3, 2018), https://ww5.komen.org/BreastCancer/Table25Abortionand 
breastcancerrisk.html [https://perma.cc/8HZA-VTL8].
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[VOL. 56: 829, 2019] Pregnant and Scared 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
representative apologized that Donna felt misled.14 The representative
continued, “But we have to fight for each other.  That’s what God wanted us
to do.  We’re all supposed to help each other.”15 
Donna’s story is not unique. She is one of many women who entered a
crisis pregnancy center (CPC) thinking it was an abortion clinic, only to 
be proselytized, shamed, and counselled with medically inaccurate 
information.16 White Rose Women’s Center is one of more than 3,500 CPCs
across the United States.17 
The California Legislature passed the Reproductive Freedom,
Accountability, Comprehensive Care, and Transparency Act (FACT Act)
in 2015 to regulate the CPCs in its state.18 The FACT Act sought to ensure 
California women were fully informed of their options by requiring licensed 
reproductive healthcare facilities to post or distribute a notice stating in part, 
“California has public programs that provide immediate free or low-cost
access to comprehensive family planning services (including all FDA-
approved methods of contraception), prenatal care, and abortion for eligible
women” (Licensed Notice).19 
14. VICE News, supra note 1.
15. Id.
16. For several examples of women’s experiences at crisis pregnancy centers across
the country, see generally NARAL PRO-CHOICE CAL. FOUND., UNMASKING FAKE CLINICS:
THE TRUTH ABOUT CRISIS PREGNANCY CENTERS IN CALIFORNIA (2010), https://www.sfcity 
attorney.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Unmasking-Fake-Clinics-The-Truth-About-Crisis-
Pregnancy-Centers-in-California-.pdf [https://perma.cc/36J4-VV3G].
17. NARAL PRO-CHOICE AM., CRISIS PREGNANCY CENTERS LIE: THE INSIDIOUS
THREAT TO REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM 1 (2015), https://www.prochoiceamerica.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/04/cpc-report-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/5FGC-ARTK]. As of 
2014, there were approximately 788 abortion clinics in the United States. Data Center, 
GUTTMACHERINST., https://data.guttmacher.org/states/table?state=US&topics=57&dataset=data 
[https://perma.cc/P6PA-FRMM]. Thus, for every abortion clinic in the United States there
more than four CPCs. 
18. A.B. 775, 2015–2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015). According to a 2018 report, 
as of 2014, 59% of California counties had one or more abortion providers; however, a 
2010 report revealed that 93% of counties had one or more CPC. Id.; GUTTMACHER INST.,
STATE FACTS ABOUT ABORTION: CALIFORNIA (2018), https://www.guttmacher.org/sites/ 
default/files/factsheet/sfaa-ca.pdf [https://perma.cc/S9CG-Q7EB].
19. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123472(a)(1) (West Supp. 2019), invalidated 
by Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). The FACT
Act also requires “unlicensed covered facilit[ies]” to disseminate a notice to clients on site
and online stating: “This facility is not licensed as a medical facility by the State of California 
and has no licensed medical provider who provides or directly supervises the provision of 
services.” Id. § 123472(b)(1). However, this Note specifically focuses on the Licensed
Notice requirement of the FACT Act. 
831




   
    
    
       
     
   
  
    
 
 
         
 




   
  
 
        
 
      
   
      
      
     
However, a few days after the FACT Act was signed into law, the National 
Institute of Family and Life Advocates (NIFLA)—an organization operating
more than 1,400 CPCs20—and two California CPCs sued the State of
California.21  The plaintiffs filed for a preliminary injunction to prevent the
FACT Act from taking effect, arguing the Licensed Notice infringed upon 
their First Amendment free speech rights.22 The case made its way to the
Supreme Court of the United States, and in June 2018 the Court held
that the plaintiffs would likely succeed on their free speech claim.23  In so
doing, the Court announced that state laws regulating professional speech
receive strict scrutiny, with just two exceptions.24 However, the Court 
determined the Licensed Notice did not fit into either exception.25 
This Note analyzes the Court’s determination that the Licensed Notice 
did not fit into either exception. Part II of this Note provides a brief overview
of CPCs and how the FACT Act was designed to curb CPCs’ interference 
with women’s reproductive autonomy. Part III discusses the litigation
between NIFLA, the CPCs, and California, culminating in a controversial 
5–4 decision in the Supreme Court. Next, Part IV argues that even if the 
Court wanted to limit the circumstances wherein professional speech 
received diminished scrutiny, it could have fit the Licensed Notice into its 
newly-delineated exceptions. This Note ultimately questions why the
Court did not fit the Licensed Notice into these exceptions, when doing so
would have yielded the fairest result for women’s reproductive autonomy. 
20. About NIFLA, NAT’L INST. FAM. & LIFE ADVOCATES (May 13, 2019, 9:38 PM), 
https://nifla.org/about-nifla/ [https://perma.cc/RT2L-5WHU]. 
21. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Harris, Civ. No. 15cv2277 JAH(DHB),
2016 WL 3627327, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2016), aff’d 839 F.3d 823 (9th Cir. 2016), 
rev’d sub nom. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361. 
22. Id. at *2.  The First Amendment provides, “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging 
the freedom of speech . . . .”  U.S. CONST. amend. I.  The First Amendment applies to the 
states through the Fourteenth Amendment.  See generally Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 
652 (1925).  The plaintiffs also challenged the FACT Act on freedom of religion grounds, 
but those claims are outside the scope of this Note.  See Harris, 2016 WL 3627327, at *2. 
23. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2376. Plaintiffs argued they were entitled to injunctive
relief because they would likely be successful on the merits of their free speech claim.  See 
Roe v. Anderson, 134 F.3d 1400, 1402 (9th Cir. 1998). 
24. Professional speech regulations will receive deferential review when they (1) 
“require professionals to disclose factual, noncontroversial information” about the services 
the professional provides or (2) “regulate professional conduct” that incidentally affects 
speech.  Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2372.  Before this decision, some courts of appeals recognized 
“professional speech” as a distinct category of speech subject to different constitutional 
protections.  See, e.g., King v. Governor of New Jersey, 767 F.3d 216, 232 (3d Cir. 2014), 
abrogated by Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361; Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1227–29 (9th 
Cir. 2014), abrogated by Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361; Moore-King v. County of Chesterfield, 
708 F.3d 560, 568–70 (4th Cir. 2013), abrogated by Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361. 
25. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2372.
832
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SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
II. BACKGROUND
CPCs are facilities that present themselves as comprehensive reproductive 
health centers but actually “aim to discourage and prevent women from 
seeking abortions.”26 NIFLA—which, as mentioned, operates more than
1,400 CPCs across the country—specifically describes itself as a faith-
based nonprofit that “envisions achieving an abortion-free America.”27 
CPCs use deceptive practices to lure women into their facilities. For
example, some CPCs post vague billboard advertisements like “Pregnant 
& Scared?” with a CPC phone number listed underneath.28 Many other CPCs
pay to appear as advertisements when individuals search keywords like 
“abortion” or “morning-after pill” online.29 CPCs use these deceptive practices 
to target young, low-income women in particular.30  They strategically advertise 
near high schools, colleges, and low-income neighborhoods.31 This is significant 
because young, low-income women are more likely to seek abortion care,32 
yet they have limited access to reproductive healthcare services due to
finances, geography, or both.33 
26. Reproductive FACT Act: Hearing on A.B. 775 Before the Assemb. Comm. on Health, 
2015–2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. 3 (Cal. 2015) [hereinafter Hearing on A.B. 775] (analysis by
Lara Flynn, Member, Assemb. Comm. on Health). About 90% of CPCs are affiliated with 
one of three pro-life organizations—the National Institute of Family and Life Advocates
(NIFLA), Care Net, and Heartbeat International. NARAL PRO-CHOICE CAL. FOUND., supra
note 16, at 5 (citing Thomas A. Glessner, NARAL Smear Tactics Distort the Truth About 
Crisis Pregnancy Centers, NAT’L INST. FAM. & LIFE ADVOCATES (Dec. 14, 2009),
https://nifla.org/naral-smear-tactics-distort-truth/ [https://perma.cc/U886-CBBS]). These 
organizations provide legal, financial, and personnel assistance to CPC affiliates across 
the country.  Id.
27. About NIFLA, supra note 20. 
28. NARAL PRO-CHOICE AM., supra note 17, at 2, 4.
29. Id. at 4.
30. NARAL PRO-CHOICE CAL. FOUND., supra note 16, at 6 (citing Free Resources, 
CARE NET (May 13, 2019, 10:02 PM), https://www.care-net.org/free-resources [https:// 
perma.cc/5BP5-SJV6]).  CPCs have also been known to target women of color. Id. (citing 
Free Resources, CARE NET (May 13, 2019, 10:02 PM), https://www.care-net.org/free-resources 
[https://perma.cc/5BP5-SJV6]). For example, Care Net has an outreach initiative that
specifically targets African-American and Latina women. Id. (citing Care Net Initiatives, 
CARE NET, http://carenet-test.digiknow.com/ourwork/program.php?id=1 [https://perma.cc/
68RP-APT5]). 
31. Id. at 6–7. 
32. Over 50% of United States abortion patients in 2014 were under thirty years old
and about 75% were poor or low-income. GUTTMACHER INST., INDUCED ABORTION IN THE 
UNITED STATES (Jan. 2018), https://www.guttmacher.org/sites/default/files/factsheet/
fb_induced_abortion.pdf [https://perma.cc/29V4-QJYY].
33. NARAL PRO-CHOICE CAL. FOUND., supra note 16, at 6.
833
POST MONTANEZ PAGES.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 9/19/2019 4:26 PM        
 
 
    
    




   
    
     
    
 
 
        
    
       
 
 
    
       
       
         
  
    
      
      
  
     
     
  
 
    
    
    
            
     
 
      
     
    
 
     




Licensed34 CPCs typically offer pregnancy tests, counseling, and
ultrasounds.35 But they also systematically provide incomplete or medically
inaccurate information about abortion.36 For instance, NARAL Pro-Choice
America investigators found that CPCs describe heavy bleeding, sepsis,
uterine perforation, and death as risks of abortion, without disclosing that
less than one-half percent of first-trimester abortions result in serious
complications.37 CPCs also inaccurately state that abortion causes breast 
cancer, infertility, “post-abortion syndrome,” and suicide.38 CPCs even delay 
some women from seeking timely access to abortion by inaccurately stating
a woman’s gestation39 or inaccurately stating that abortion is legal in the
United States throughout all nine months of pregnancy.40 
34. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1204 (West 2019) (describing the types
of medical clinics eligible for licensure by the State of California). 
35. NARAL PRO-CHOICE CAL. FOUND., supra note 16, at 4–5 (citing NARAL PRO-
CHOICE MD. FUND, THE TRUTH REVEALED: MARYLAND CRISIS PREGNANCY CENTER
INVESTIGATIONS (2008), https://maryland.prochoiceamericaaffiliates.org/wp-content/uploads/
sites/11/2018/04/crisispregnancycenterreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/7VXK-C6XH]).
36. See NARAL PRO-CHOICE AM., supra note 17, at 7. 
37. Id. (first citing NARAL PRO-CHOICE MASS., “JUST BECAUSE YOU’RE PREGNANT . . .”:
LIES, HALF TRUTHS, AND MANIPULATION AT CRISIS PREGNANCY CENTERS IN MASSACHUSETTS 11
(2011); and then citing GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 32). Actually, “pregnancy and childbirth
[are] riskier than most abortions.” How Safe Is the Abortion Pill?, PLANNED PARENTHOOD, 
https://www.plannedparenthood.org/learn/abortion/the-abortion-pill/how-safe-is-the-abortion-
pill [https://perma.cc/ZF49-J9GB]. NARAL Pro-Choice America is an organization of 
more than two million individuals “fighting for access to abortion care, birth control, paid 
parental leave[,] and protections from pregnancy discrimination.” About Us, NARAL PRO-
CHOICE AM., https://www.prochoiceamerica.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/LB4R-728Q].
38. NARAL PRO-CHOICE AM., supra note 17, at 7. “Post-abortion syndrome” and
“post-abortion stress disorder” are not included in any medical diagnostic manual and are 
not recognized conditions by medical professionals. Id. at 9 (citing Countering Misinformation:
MENTAL HEALTH ISSUES AND ABORTION, ADVANCING NEW STANDARDS REPROD.
HEALTH, http://www.ansirh.org/research/late-abortion/countering-misinformation/mental-
health-abortion.php [perma.cc/D5WB-AHS7]). See generally Reva B. Siegel, The New
Politics of Abortion: An Equality Analysis of Woman-Protective Abortion Restrictions, 2007 U.
ILL. L. REV. 991 (2007) (discussing the unconstitutionality of woman-protective abortion 
restrictions).
39. At White Rose Women’s Health Center in Dallas, Texas, Donna was told she
was nine weeks pregnant when she was actually only seven weeks pregnant. VICE News, 
supra note 1.
40. See, e.g., NARAL PRO-CHOICE AM., supra note 17, at 12 (citing NARAL PRO-CHOICE 
N.Y. FOUND., “SHE SAID ABORTION COULD CAUSE BREAST CANCER”: A REPORT ON THE
LIES, MANIPULATIONS, AND PRIVACY VIOLATIONS OF CRISIS PREGNANCY CENTERS IN NEW
YORK CITY 11 (2010), https://www.nirhealth.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/cpcreport 
2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/V9HX-E2KK]). The majority of states in the United States 
prohibit abortion after a certain gestational point. State Bans on Abortion Throughout Pregnancy, 
GUTTMACHER INST. (May 1, 2019), https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/state-
policies-later-abortions [https://perma.cc/T6S5-RPQL]. Roe v. Wade allows states to prohibit 
abortion after viability.  410 U.S. 113, 163–64 (1973). 
834
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[VOL. 56: 829, 2019] Pregnant and Scared 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
To curb CPCs’ “interfere[nce] with women’s ability to be fully informed
and exercise their reproductive rights” via “deceptive advertising and 
counseling practices” that “often confuse, misinform, and even intimidate 
women from making fully-informed, time-sensitive decisions about critical
health care,”41 the California Legislature passed the FACT Act.42  The Act’s
express purpose was to ensure that California women were “fully informed 
of their options and [were] able to make their own healthcare and pregnancy- 
related decisions.”43 
The FACT Act had an eye toward protecting economically disadvantaged 
women in particular.44 Because economically disadvantaged women have 
diminished access to reproductive care, they may think a CPC is their only
option.45 But in California, there are public programs available to provide
women with contraception, health education and counseling, family planning, 
prenatal care, abortion, and delivery.46 Accordingly, the FACT Act wanted
pregnant women to be aware of these public programs as soon as possible
in order to make time-sensitive reproductive decisions.47 
41. Hearing on A.B. 775, supra note 26, at 6–7. 
42. A.B. 775, 2015–2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015). See generally Caroline Mala 
Corbin, Compelled Disclosures, 65 ALA. L. REV. 1277, 1339–51 (2014) (discussing other
local governments that passed similar legislation and evaluating the constitutionality of 
such compelled disclosures). 
43. Reproductive FACT Act: Hearing on A.B. 775 Before the Assemb. Comm. on Judiciary, 
2015–2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. 2 (Cal. 2015) (analysis by Eric Dang & Anthony Lew, Members,
Assemb. Comm. on Judiciary).
44. See Cal. A.B. 775. Unintended pregnancy disproportionately affects economically 
disadvantaged women. See Heather D. Boonstra, Abortion in the Lives of Women Struggling 
Financially: Why Insurance Coverage Matters, 19 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 46, 47 (2016). In
2011, the rate of unintended pregnancies “among women with an income below the federal 
poverty level . . . was more than five times” that of women with incomes above 200%
the federal poverty level. Id. (citing Lawrence B. Finer & Mia R. Zolna, Declines in Unintended 
Pregnancy in the United States, 2008–2011, NEW ENG. J. MED. (Mar. 3, 2016), https://www.
nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMsa1506575 [https://perma.cc/9FCB-64SE]). 
45. NARAL PRO-CHOICE CAL. FOUND., supra note 16, at 6.
46. Cal. A.B. 775. California has the Family PACT and Presumptive Eligibility for 
Pregnant Women Medi-Cal programs that provide low-income women with immediate
access to free or low-cost comprehensive family planning services and pregnancy-related
care. Id. According to the Department of Health Care Services, the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act expansion has made millions of Californians—more than half of
whom are women—eligible for Medi-Cal, California’s Medicaid program.  Hearing on
A.B. 775, supra note 26, at 6. 
47. Cal. A.B. 775.
835
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To achieve this goal, the FACT Act required “licensed covered facilities”48 
that provide family planning or pregnancy-related services to post or distribute 
a notice stating in part, “California has public programs that provide immediate 
free or low-cost access to comprehensive family planning services (including
all FDA-approved methods of contraception), prenatal care, and abortion 
for eligible women.”49 The Act required the Licensed Notice to be “posted
in a conspicuous place” like a waiting room, printed and distributed to all 
clients, or digitally distributed to all clients at check-in.50 
III. THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF FAMILY AND LIFE
ADVOCATES V. BECERRA 
The governor of California signed the FACT Act into law on October
9, 2015.51 A few days later, NIFLA, one unlicensed CPC,52 and one licensed 
CPC (collectively Plaintiffs) sued the State of California.53 Plaintiffs filed 
a motion for preliminary injunction, arguing “their right to freedom
of speech . . . will be violated when the Act becomes effective because it
forces them to recite government messages promoting abortion and deterring
48. A “licensed covered facility” for purposes of the FACT Act is:
[A] facility licensed under Section 1204 or an intermittent clinic operating under 
a primary care clinic pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1206, whose primary
purpose is providing family planning or pregnancy-related services, and that satisfies
two or more of the following: (1) The facility offers obstetric ultrasounds, obstetric
sonograms, or prenatal care to pregnant women. (2) The facility provides, or offers
counseling about, contraception or contraceptive methods. (3) The facility offers 
pregnancy testing or pregnancy diagnosis.  (4) The facility advertises or solicits patrons
with offers to provide prenatal sonography, pregnancy tests, or pregnancy options
counseling. (5) The facility offers abortion services. (6) The facility has staff or
volunteers who collect health information from clients. 
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123471(a) (West Supp. 2019). 
49. Id. § 123472(a)(1), invalidated by Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 
138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). 
50. Id. § 123472(a)(2). 
51. Cal. A.B. 775.
52. Most CPCs are unlicensed.  NARAL PRO-CHOICE CAL. FOUND., supra note 16, 
at 5. Unlicensed CPCs offer non-medical services like counseling and pregnancy tests that 
the client takes herself. Id.
53. See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Harris, Civ. No. 15cv2277 JAH(DHB),
2016 WL 3627327, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2016), aff’d 839 F.3d 823 (9th Cir. 2016), rev’d sub
nom. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). Specifically, 
the defendants were Kamala Harris in her official capacity as Attorney General for the  
State of California, Edmund D. Brown in his official capacity as Governor of the State of 
California, Thomas Montgomery in his official capacity as County Counsel for San Diego 
County, and Morgan Foley in his official capacity as attorney for the City of El Cajon in 
the Southern District of California. Id.
836
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[VOL. 56: 829, 2019] Pregnant and Scared 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
women from speaking with them.”54 Accordingly, Plaintiffs urged the
court to enjoin enforcement of the FACT Act until their suit was resolved.55 
To get injunctive relief, Plaintiffs had to show they would likely be 
successful on their free speech claim.56  To do so, Plaintiffs argued that the 
FACT Act constituted content57 and viewpoint58 discrimination because it 
“target[ed] ‘crisis pregnancy centers,’ that ‘aim to discourage and prevent
women from seeking abortions,’ by ‘deceptive advertising and counseling 
practices [that] often confuse, misinform, and even intimidate women,’”
contrary to their pro-life position.59 As such, Plaintiffs contended the FACT
Act was subject to strict scrutiny and did not survive that level of scrutiny.60 
California argued that, under Pickup v. Brown,61 the Licensed Notice
regulated professional conduct and was therefore subject to rational basis 
54. Id. at *2 (quoting Plaintiff’s Notice of Motion and Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction at 1, Harris, 2016 WL 3627327, at *1 (Civ. No. 15cv2277 JAH(DHB)). 
55. Id.
56. Id. at *3. A party seeking injunctive relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
65 “must show either (1) a combination of probable success on the merits and the possibility of
irreparable injury or (2) that serious questions are raised and the balance of hardships tips
in [the moving party’s] favor.”  Roe v. Anderson, 134 F.3d 1400, 1402 (9th Cir. 1998). 
57. A regulation discriminates based on content when “on its face,” the regulation
“draws distinctions based on the message a speaker conveys.” Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 
S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015) (quoting Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 566 (2011)). 
58. A regulation discriminates based on viewpoint when it regulates speech “based 
on ‘the specific motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker.’”  Id. at 2230 
(quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995)). 
59. Harris, 2016 WL 3627327, at *7 (quoting Combined Reply Brief in Support of
Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 7, id. (Civ. No. 15cv2277 JAH(DHB)). 
60. Id. In evaluating the constitutionality of a particular law or regulation, the Court 
will apply one of three levels of scrutiny. See id. at *9. Strict scrutiny requires the challenged 
law to be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest. See id. Intermediate scrutiny 
requires the challenged law to be substantially related to achieve an important state interest. See 
id. at *8.  And under rational basis review, the challenged law must be rationally related
to a legitimate state interest.  See id. at *7.  Content-based regulations are “presumptively 
unconstitutional” and must survive strict scrutiny. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2226. 
61. 740 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2014), abrogated by Nat’l  Inst. of  Family & Life  
Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). The Ninth Circuit in Pickup perceived First 
Amendment protection of professional speech as existing along a continuum. Id. at 1227.  
The court stated:
At one end of the continuum, where a professional is engaged in a public dialogue, 
First Amendment protection is at its greatest. Thus, for example, a doctor who 
publicly advocates a treatment that the medical establishment considers outside
the mainstream, or even dangerous, is entitled to robust protection under the First 
Amendment—just as any person is—even though the state has the power to regulate
medicine. 
837




     
      
    
       
    
      
 
 
   
  
  
   




   
 
        
    
       
  
    
   
  
  
     
      
    
  
 
           
 
 
   
      
        
      
       
review.62  Specifically, California argued that the requirement regulated “the
delivery of pregnancy-related health care services and [did] not concern 
expressive activity.”63 California further argued that the FACT Act should
be upheld under Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey.64 California interpreted Casey to mean that “the state can use  
regulatory authority to require physicians to provide information regarding
abortion in a non-misleading, truthful way even if the information might 
encourage the patient to choose something other than abortion.”65 
A. The Lower Courts’ Opinions
The district court held that Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a likelihood 
of success on the merits of their free speech challenge to the Licensed
Notice.66 Accordingly, the court denied Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary 
injunction.67 The court agreed with California that the Licensed Notice
regulated professional conduct, not speech.68 The court determined that the
Licensed Notice did not regulate speech because it did not preclude Plaintiffs 
from speaking their message.69 Rather, the Licensed Notice regulated conduct 
because it mandated disclosure of treatment options to ensure patients 
made fully informed decisions regarding their pregnancies.70  The court
Id. At the middle of the continuum, First Amendment protection is “somewhat diminished”
because “[w]hen professionals, by means of their state-issued licenses, form relationships 
with clients, the purpose of those relationships is to advance the welfare of the clients, rather 
than to contribute to public debate.” Id. at 1228. At the other end of the continuum lies 
professional conduct, such as medical treatment, where First Amendment protection is the
weakest. Id. at 1229.
62. Harris, 2016 WL 3627327, at *5. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. at *6 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882–884
(1992) (plurality opinion)).  Casey upheld a law requiring physicians to inform patients 
considering an abortion about the nature of the abortion procedure, the health risks of  
abortion and childbirth, the probable gestational age of the fetus, and the availability of printed 
material describing the consequences to the fetus, alternatives to abortion, and a list of public 
and private agencies that offer financial assistance.  Casey, 505 U.S. at 881, 884. 
65. Harris, 2016 WL 3627327, at *6. See generally Veneeta Jaswal, A New Approach 
to Abortion Informed Consent Laws: How an Evidence Law Framework Can Clarify Casey’s
Truthful, Non-Misleading Standard, 6 LAWS 1 (2017).
66. Harris, 2016 WL 3627327, at *9. 
67.  Id. at *9, *11. 
68. Id. at *7. For a description of the professional speech continuum under Pickup, 
see supra note 61 and accompanying text.
69.  Harris, 2016 WL 3627327, at *7. 
70. Id. The district court thought the Licensed Notice was similar to the regulation
in Pickup. Id.  In that case, a California law subjected mental health professionals engaging in
“sexual orientation change efforts” with minor clients to professional discipline. Pickup v. 
Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1215 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 865.1, 
865.2 (West Supp. 2019)), abrogated by Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra,
838
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therefore applied rational basis review per Pickup and concluded, “The 
state clearly has a legitimate interest in ensuring pregnant [women] are fully 
advised of their rights and treatment options when making reproductive health
care decisions and the required disclosure is undeniably rationally related
to that interest.”71 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed.72 However, it disagreed with the district court
that the Licensed Notice regulated conduct; it concluded that the Licensed
Notice was a content-based regulation of speech because it “‘mandates 
speech that a speaker would not otherwise make’ which ‘necessarily alters 
the content of the speech.’”73 Specifically, the court determined the Licensed 
Notice regulated professional speech.74 It found that because licensed clinics
offer medical and clinical family-planning services in a professional context, 
“[a]ll the speech related to the clinics’ professional services that occurs 
within the clinics’ walls, including within [] the waiting room, is part of the
clinics’ professional practice.”75 Accordingly, the court applied intermediate
scrutiny under Pickup76 and concluded that the Licensed Notice survived
such scrutiny.77 The court reasoned, “California has a substantial interest 
in the health of its citizens, including ensuring that its citizens have access
to and adequate information about constitutionally-protected medical
services like abortion.”78 
138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). The court held that this law regulated conduct, specifically treatment.
Id. at 1229, 1231. 
71. Harris, 2016 WL 3627327, at *7. 
72. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Harris, 839 F.3d 823, 829 (9th Cir. 
2016), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361. 
73. Id. at 835 (quoting Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 
795 (1988)). The Ninth Circuit disagreed the Licensed Notice discriminated based on 
viewpoint, however, because it “does not discriminate based on the particular opinion, 
point of view, or ideology of a certain speaker” but “merely states the existence of
publicly-funded family-planning services.”  Id. at 835–36. 
74. Id. at 839. See generally Claudia E. Haupt, Professional Speech, 125 YALE L.J. 
1238 (2016) (providing a comprehensive account of the doctrinal and theoretical bases of 
professional speech pre-Becerra).
75. Harris, 839 F.3d at 840. 
76. Id. (Strict scrutiny does not apply because the licensed clinics “are not engaging
in a public dialogue when treating their clients,” and rational basis review does not apply
because the “Licensed [N]otice does not regulate therapy, treatment, medication, or any other
type of conduct.”). 
77. Id. at 841. 
78. Id. 
839
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B. The Supreme Court Majority Opinion 
In a 5–4 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, holding 
that Plaintiffs demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of their 
free speech claim.79 
In the majority opinion—authored by Justice Thomas and joined by 
Chief Justice Roberts as well as Justices Kennedy, Alito, and Gorsuch—
the Court agreed with the Ninth Circuit that the Licensed Notice was “a
content-based regulation of speech” because it compelled clinics to provide
information about the availability of state-sponsored services.80 However, 
the Court disagreed that the Licensed Notice was subject to intermediate
scrutiny because it regulated professional speech.81 Significantly, the Court 
proclaimed that it does not recognize professional speech as a distinct
category of speech, abrogating Pickup.82 
Rather, the Court declared it only affords less First Amendment protection
to speech uttered by professionals in just two circumstances.83  The Court 
will apply deferential review to state laws that (1) “require professionals 
to disclose factual, noncontroversial information” about the services the
professional provides (Zauderer exception)84 or (2) regulate professional 
conduct that incidentally affects speech (Casey exception).85 
The Court determined that the Licensed Notice did not fit into either
exception.86 More specifically, the Court reasoned that the Licensed Notice 
79. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2378 (2018).
80. Id. at 2368, 2371, 2378. The Court added, “By requiring [Plaintiffs] to inform 
women how they can obtain state-subsidized abortions—at the same time [Plaintiffs] try 
to dissuade women from choosing that option—the licensed notice plainly ‘alters the content’
of [Plaintiffs’] speech.” Id. at 2371 (quoting Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc.,
487 U.S. 781, 795 (1988)). See generally Eugene Volokh, The Law of Compelled Speech, 97 TEX.
L.REV.355 (2018) (discussing the categories of government action constituting compelled speech
post-Becerra).
81. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2371.
82. Id. at 2371–72; see also Robert McNamara & Paul Sherman, NIFLA v. Becerra: 
A Seismic Decision Protecting Occupational Speech, 2018 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 197, 220
(submitting that the Court’s rejection of the professional-speech exception marks a major 
change in the law). 
83. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2372. 
84. Id.  The Court  in  Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel upheld a rule 
requiring lawyers who advertised their services on a contingency-fee basis to disclose that 
clients might be required to pay some fees and costs. 471 U.S. 626, 652, 655–56 (1985).  
The Court found this requirement to be “reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing
deception of consumers.”  Id. at 651. 
85. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2372. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania 
v. Casey upheld an abortion formed consent law because it regulated speech only “as part
of the practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by the state.”  
505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992) (plurality opinion). 
86. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2372. 
840
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did not fit into the Zauderer exception because “[t]he [N]otice in no way
relates to the services that licensed clinics provide” and abortion is “anything
but an ‘uncontroversial’ topic.”87 And the Licensed Notice did not fit into
the Casey exception because it “is not an informed-consent requirement
or any other regulation of professional conduct.”88 
Thus, the Court concluded the Licensed Notice was by default subject 
to strict scrutiny,89 but asserted that the Notice was unlikely to survive 
even intermediate scrutiny.90 The Court opined that the Licensed Notice
was not sufficiently drawn to achieve California’s interest in “providing 
low-income women with information about state-sponsored services.”91 
The Court believed that the Licensed Notice was “wildly underinclusive”
because it only applied to clinics that primarily provide family-planning 
or pregnancy-related services, instead of all kinds of community clinics, 
and that California could achieve its interest with a public-information
campaign.92 
C. The Supreme Court Dissenting Opinion
Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Ginsburg, 
Sotomayor, and Kagan.93 The dissent took issue with the idea that all content-
based speech is subject to strict scrutiny except speech falling under the 
Zauderer exception or the Casey exception.94 According to the dissent, 
this interpretation of the First Amendment “threatens to create serious
problems” because “[v]irtually every disclosure law could be considered 
‘content based,’ for virtually every disclosure law requires individuals ‘to 
speak a particular message.’”95 Thus, the majority’s constitutional framework 
87. Id. 
88. Id. at 2373. 
89. See id. at 2375. Under Reed v. Town of Gilbert, content-based regulations are
generally subject to strict scrutiny. 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015). The Court determined California 
did not provide a sufficient reason to except the Licensed Notice from this general rule.
See Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2375. 
90. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2375. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. at 2375–76 (quoting Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 802 (2011)).
93. Id. at 2367. 
94. See id. at 2380 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
95. Id.
841





   
 
 
    
 
     
 
  
    
      
 
     
 
 
   
        
        




   
   
      
   
     
        
 
     
    
 
 
could put much of securities law, consumer protection law, or ordinary disclosure 
requirements in the healthcare context at risk.96 
Instead of pronouncing and applying the majority’s new First Amendment 
framework, the dissent would have simply applied Casey as controlling
authority.97  In Casey, the Supreme Court upheld a law that required physicians 
to inform patients considering an abortion about the nature of the abortion 
procedure, health risks of abortion and childbirth, probable gestational age
of the fetus, consequences to the fetus, alternatives to abortion, and financial 
assistance.98  The Court wrote: 
All that is left of petitioners’ argument is an asserted First Amendment right of a 
physician not to provide information about the risks of abortion, and childbirth, 
in a manner mandated by the State.  To be sure, the physician’s First Amendment
rights not to speak are implicated, but only as part of the practice of medicine, subject 
to reasonable licensing and regulation by the State. We see no constitutional
infirmity in the requirement that the physician provide the information mandated 
by the State here.99 
Accordingly, since a state can constitutionally require a doctor to tell a 
woman seeking an abortion about adoption services and financial assistance, 
the dissent maintained that “the law’s demand for evenhandedness” should 
allow a state to “require [medical counselors] to tell a woman seeking prenatal
care or other reproductive healthcare about childbirth and abortion services.”100 
Indeed, the dissent urged, the demand for evenhandedness is even greater 
in cases addressing topics of moral debate, like abortion, on which Americans 
have such strong, opposing views.101 
96. Id. The dissent offered California Vehicle Code section 27363.5 as one example, 
which required hospitals to tell parents about child seat belts.  Id. (citing CAL. VEH. CODE 
§ 27363.5 (West 2019)).  This requirement, the dissent pointed out, would not fall under 
the Zauderer exception nor the Casey exception.  Id.; see First Amendment—Freedom of 
Speech—Compelled Speech—National Institute of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 
132 HARV. L. REV. 347, 351 (2018) (“NIFLA represents a dramatic expansion of the scope 
of First Amendment protection for commercial speech that threatens the entire foundation 
of a broad range of consumer protections.  If limited to the abortion context, ‘the majority 
has chosen the winners’ between ideological viewpoints ‘by turning the First Amendment 
into a sword.’” (quoting Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2501 (2018) (Kagan, 
J., dissenting))). 
97. See Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2385–86 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
98. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 881 (1992) (plurality opinion). 
99. Id. at 884 (citations omitted). 
100. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2385 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“After all, the rule of law
embodies evenhandedness, and ‘what is sauce for the goose is normally sauce for the gander.’”
(quoting Heffernan v. City of Paterson, 136 S. Ct. 1412, 1418 (2016))). 
101. Id. at 2388. In 2018, 48% of Americans identify as pro-choice and 48% as pro-
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IV. THE SUPREME COURT COULD HAVE, BUT DID NOT, FIT THE 
LICENSED NOTICE INTO EITHER EXCEPTION 
The Court refused to recognize “professional speech” as a distinct category 
of speech—and held professional speech receives deferential review in just
two circumstances—because it wanted to limit the categories of speech subject
to diminished constitutional protection.102 When government regulates
professional speech, it risks “suppress[ing] unpopular ideas or information”103 
and “fail[ing] to ‘preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which 
truth will ultimately prevail.’”104 Accepting that position, the Court nevertheless 
could have fit the Licensed Notice into either exception.  But it did not.  
Notably, the Court was quite conclusory in deciding that the Licensed Notice 
did not fit into either exception. 
A. The Court Could Have Fit the Licensed Notice into the 
Zauderer Exception 
Again, the Zauderer exception permits deferential review to laws requiring 
professionals to disclose “purely factual and uncontroversial information
about the terms under which . . . services will be available.”105 In rejecting 
the Licensed Notice’s fit into the Zauderer exception, the Court simply
stated, “The [N]otice in no way relates to the services that licensed clinics
provide. Instead, it requires these clinics to disclose information about 
state-sponsored services—including abortion, anything but an ‘uncontroversial’
topic.”106 
But the Court could have fit the Licensed Notice into the Zauderer 
exception, as defined by the Court. For one, it is readily conceivable that
the Licensed Notice related to the services that licensed clinics provide.
A “licensed covered facility” for purposes of the FACT Act is a licensed
facility “whose primary purpose is providing family planning or pregnancy- 
102. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2372 (“This Court has ‘been reluctant to mark off new categories
of speech for diminished constitutional protection.’” (quoting Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. 
Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 804 (1996))). 
103. Id. at 2374 (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994)).
104. Id. (quoting McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2529 (2014)). 
105. Id. at 2372 (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 
651 (1985)).  Under Zauderer, a law requiring a commercial speaker to disclose “purely 
factual and uncontroversial information” need only be “reasonably related to the State’s 
interest in preventing deception of consumers.”  Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651. 
106. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2372.
843
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related services,” such as ultrasounds, contraception counseling, pregnancy 
testing, pregnancy options counseling, or abortions.107 And the Licensed 
Notice required these facilities to post or distribute a notice stating in part, 
“California has public programs that provide immediate free or low-cost
access to comprehensive family planning services (including all FDA-approved
methods of contraception), prenatal care, and abortion for eligible women.”108 
So, although the Licensed Notice required licensed covered facilities to
provide information about state-sponsored services, it cannot be said that
those services in no way related to the services these facilities provide. As 
the Becerra dissent pointed out, contraception is a family-planning service,
ultrasounds and pregnancy testing are prenatal care, and abortion is a 
service identified in both the Licensed Notice and the services that qualify
a clinic as a “licensed covered facility.”109 Indeed, it would be reasonable
to say that the Licensed Notice related to the exact same services the licensed 
covered facilities provide.
Secondly, although abortion is a controversial topic,110 the fact that California 
provides free or low-cost access to reproductive healthcare, including
abortion, is “purely factual and uncontroversial.”111 The Supreme Court
has not expressly defined “purely factual and uncontroversial.”  In Zauderer,
the Court upheld a rule that required lawyers advertising their services on 
a contingency-fee basis to disclose that clients might be required to pay some 
fees and costs.112 The Court upheld this rule because it mandated disclosure
of “purely factual and uncontroversial information” as opposed to “prescrib[ing] 
107. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123471(a) (West Supp. 2019). 
108. Id. § 123472(a)(1), invalidated by Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 
138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). 
109. See Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2387 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
110. See Karlyn Bowman & Jennifer Marsico, Opinions About Abortion Haven’t
Changed Since Roe v. Wade, ATLANTIC (Jan. 22, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/
politics/archive/2014/01/opinions-about-abortion-havent-changed-since-em-roe-v-wade-
em/283226/ [https:// perma.cc/2LA7-2NFZ] (“Most Americans are deeply conflicted about 
abortion. Many believe it is an act of murder.  But polls also show that Americans
simultaneously believe that the decision to have an abortion should be a personal choice 
between a woman and her doctor. These two ideas are in deep conflict but many people 
hold these contradictory views and see no need to reconcile them.”). For a concise overview of
the judicial and legislative history of abortion regulation, see generally JON O. SHIMABUKURO,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33467, ABORTION: JUDICIAL HISTORY AND LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE
(2014).
111. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2376. 
112. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 652, 655–56 (1985).  
The plaintiff in Zauderer was an attorney who ran an advertisement in the local newspaper 
advertising that “his law firm would represent defendants in drunken driving cases and that 
his clients’ ‘full legal fee would be refunded if they were convicted of DRUNK DRIVING.’”  Id. 
at 629–30. 
844
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what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters 
of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”113 
The circuit courts have attempted to define “purely factual and
uncontroversial.”114 The NinthCircuit, for instance, understands“uncontroversial” 
as referring to the “factual accuracy of the compelled disclosure, not to its 
subjective impact on the audience.”115 Thus, according to the Ninth Circuit,
“a disclosure may be ‘purely factual and uncontroversial’ although it disturbs 
the party being compelled to make the disclosure or disturbs its customers,
including if it ‘discourages the latter from’ purchasing the product or service
at issue or ‘harms the reputation’ of the entity that previously benefitted
from the misleading advertising.”116 
Under this definition, the Licensed Notice was plainly “purely factual
and uncontroversial.” The Licensed Notice perhaps disturbed CPCs and 
could have discouraged women from pursuing reproductive healthcare services
at CPCs. However, the information contained in the Licensed Notice was 
factually accurate. California, in fact, has public programs that provide
immediate free or low-cost access to reproductive healthcare, including
abortion. California provides access to these services through its Medi-
Cal and Family PACT programs.117 
113. Id. at 651 (quoting W. Va. State Bd. Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)).  
The Zauderer Court distinguished the mandated disclosure at issue from the mandated 
disclosure in Wooley v. Maynard, wherein the state required noncommercial motor vehicles to 
bear licensed plates embossed with the state’s motto, “Live Free or Die.”  Id. at 650–51 (citing 
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977)). 
114. See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n Mfrs. v. SEC, 800 F.3d 518, 528 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“One 
clue is that ‘uncontroversial,’ as a legal test, must mean something different than ‘purely 
factual.’ . . . Perhaps the distinction is between fact and opinion.  But that line is often blurred, 
and it is far from clear that all opinions are controversial.”); Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t 
of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 34 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“To be sure, 
determining whether a disclosure is ‘uncontroversial’ may be difficult in some compelled 
commercial speech cases, in part because it is unclear how we should assess and what we 
should examine to determine whether a mandatory disclosure is controversial.”); see also 
Frederick Schauer, Facts and the First Amendment, 57 UCLA L. REV. 897, 898 (2010) 
(examining the relationship between the First Amendment and facts). 
115. Nationwide Biweekly Admin., Inc. v. Owen, 873 F.3d 716, 732 (9th Cir. 2017)
(quoting CTIA-The Wireless Ass’n v. City of Berkeley, 854 F.3d 1105, 1117 (9th Cir. 2017), 
cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 2708 (2018)).  In Owen, the Ninth Circuit held that requiring a 
mortgage refinancing company to disclose to lenders’ customers that its solicitations are not 
authorized by their mortgage lenders is “purely factual and uncontroversial.”  See id. at 733. 
116. Id. at 732 (quoting CTIA-The Wireless Ass’n, 854 F.3d at 1118). 
117. A.B. 775, 2015–2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015). 
845




   
   
      
  
   
   
        
     
 
     
    
       
   
 
    




       
 
  
   
     
  
     
 
               
  
         
        
    
   
    
         
 
   
            
   
The Licensed Notice was like other mandated disclosures deemed “purely 
factual and uncontroversial” in the circuit courts. For example, the Ninth 
Circuit concluded that an Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulation
requiring municipalities to “distribute educational materials to the community . . .
about the impacts of stormwater discharges on water bodies and the steps
the public can take to reduce pollutants in stormwater runoff”118 mandated
“purely factual and uncontroversial” information.119 The court reasoned 
that informing the public about safe toxin disposal involved no “affirmation
of belief”120 and did not prevent the municipalities from “stating [their] own 
views about the proper means of managing toxic materials.”121 
On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit determined that a state law requiring 
“sexually explicit” video games—by the state’s standards—to bear an “18”
sticker did not mandate “purely factual and uncontroversial” information.122 
Because deciding whether something is “sexually explicit” is opinion-based, 
“[t]he sticker ultimately communicates a subjective and highly controversial
message—that the game’s content is sexually explicit.”123 
The Licensed Notice was more like the EPA regulation than the “18”
sticker. Like the EPA regulation, the Licensed Notice asserted no affirmation 
nor belief. It did not suggest that women ought to receive family planning, 
prenatal, or abortion services, nor did it offer any normative statement
about these services. And unlike the “18” sticker, the Licensed Notice did
not depend on an opinion. Rather, it merely stated the fact that California
has public programs providing free or low-cost access to reproductive 
healthcare.
Indeed, the very purpose of the FACT Act comports with Zauderer’s
underlying rationale. Zauderer justified applying rational basis review to
“purely factual and uncontroversial” mandates because “[commercial speakers’]
constitutionally protected interest in not providing any particular factual 
information in [their] advertising is minimal.”124 Such mandates can be
118. Envtl. Def. Ctr., Inc. v. EPA, 344 F.3d 832, 848 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting 40 C.F.R.
§ 122.34(b)(1)(i) (2011)). 
119. Id. at 851. 
120. Id. at 850 (quoting PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 88 (1980)).
121. Id.; see also Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 27 (D.C. Cir. 
2014) (holding that the country of origin of meat is “purely factual and uncontroversial”);
N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 134 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding 
that calorie content on menus is “purely factual and uncontroversial”); Nat’l Elec. Mfrs.
Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 115 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that the presence of mercury
in a product is “purely factual and uncontroversial”). 
122. Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641, 652 (7th Cir. 2006). 
123. Id.; see also Nat’l Ass’n Mfrs. v. SEC, 800 F.3d 518, 530 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (stating 
in dicta that a “not conflict free” label was not “purely factual and uncontroversial” because 
“‘not conflict free’ is a metaphor that conveys moral responsibility for the Congo war”). 
124. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985). 
846
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necessary “to dissipate the possibility of consumer confusion or deception.”125 
This rationale applies with equal force to the FACT Act, which aimed to
curb CPCs’ “deceptive advertising and counseling practices [that] often
confuse, misinform, and even intimidate women from making fully-informed, 
time-sensitive decisions about critical health care.”126 
Evidently, instead of deeming the Licensed Notice not “purely factual 
and uncontroversial” because it used the term “abortion,” the Court could
have deemed the Licensed Notice “purely factual and uncontroversial”
if it focused on the Licensed Notice’s factual nature. Of course, abortion is a
controversial topic. But California does, in fact, have public programs providing 
access to reproductive healthcare, including abortion.  That is not debatable. 
B. The Court Could Have Fit the Licensed Notice into the
Casey Exception 
The Court could have fit the Licensed Notice into the Casey exception
too, if it had broadened its conception of informed consent. Again, the
Casey exception affords deferential review to state regulations of professional 
conduct, even if that conduct incidentally involves speech.127 The Court
described obtaining informed consent to a medical procedure, like abortion, 
as an example of professional conduct incidentally involving speech.128 
In rejecting the Licensed Notice’s fit into the Casey exception, the Court 
stated:
The [L]icensed [N]otice at issue here is not an informed-consent requirement or
any other regulation of professional conduct. The notice does not facilitate
informed consent to a medical procedure. In fact, it is not tied to a procedure at all.
It applies to all interactions between a covered facility and its clients, regardless of
whether a medical procedure is ever sought, offered, or performed.129 
But the Court could have fit the Licensed Notice into the Casey exception
if it understood informed consent as not necessarily tied to discrete medical 
procedures. Indeed, the Court should have understood informed consent 
as embracing a range of treatment options. 
In Casey, the Court considered a law requiring physicians to inform 
patients considering an abortion about the nature of the abortion procedure, 
125. Id. (quoting In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 201 (1982)). 
126.  Hearing on A.B. 775, supra note 26, at 7. 
127.  Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2372 (2018). 
128. See id. at 2373. 
129. Id. at 2373–74. 
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the health risks of abortion and childbirth, the probable gestational age of 
the fetus, the availability of state-published material describing the 
consequences to the fetus, alternatives to abortion, and a list of public and 
private agencies that offer financial assistance.130 Like Plaintiffs, the petitioners 
in Casey argued that the statute violated physicians’ First Amendment
right “not to provide information about the risks of abortion, and childbirth, 
in a manner mandated by the State.”131 However, the Court swiftly rejected
this claim and upheld the statute: 
To be sure, the physician’s First Amendment rights not to speak are implicated,
but only as part of the practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and
regulation by the State. We see no constitutional infirmity in the requirement that 
the physician provide the information mandated by the State here.132 
In other words, states can constitutionally regulate the practice of medicine.133 
Obtaining informed consent is part of the practice of medicine.134 Therefore,
states can constitutionally regulate informed consent. And regulating informed
consent includes requiring physicians to provide certain information— 
even state-published financial information about childbirth and adoption— 
when obtaining women’s informed consent to abortion.135 
Becerra held that the Licensed Notice did not fit into this constitutional
scheme because it required CPCs to provide certain information regardless 
of whether a medical procedure was “sought, offered, or performed.”136 
This, the Court opined, disqualified the Licensed Notice from being an
informed consent regulation.137 Ergo, in the Court’s view, the Licensed Notice
was not a constitutional regulation of the practice of medicine, nor of 
professional conduct generally.138 
130. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 879, 881 (1992) (plurality opinion). 
131. Id. at 884. 
132. Id. (citations omitted).
133. The states and their medical boards regulate the practice of medicine pursuant 
to their Tenth Amendment police power.  U.S. CONST. amend. X.  The Tenth Amendment 
does not explicitly state that healthcare is an enumerated state power but such power is 
implied.  The Supreme Court interprets the powers reserved for the states as “police powers,” 
which are best exercised by states to protect their citizens’ health, safety, and welfare.  See 
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 203–06 (1824). 
134. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 884.
135. Id. (“Thus, a requirement that a doctor give a woman certain information as part 
of obtaining her consent to an abortion is, for constitutional purposes, no different from a 
requirement that a doctor give certain specific information about any medical procedure.”). 
136. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2373–74 (2018).
The Licensed Notice was to be “posted in a conspicuous place” like a waiting room, 
printed and distributed to all clients, or digitally distributed to all clients at check-in.  CAL. 
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123472(a)(2) (West Supp. 2019), invalidated by Nat’l Inst. of 
Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). 
137. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2373–74. 
138. Id. 
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However, the Court took an overly narrow view of informed consent to
reach this conclusion—one that is contrary to legal and medical informed
consent standards. Under legal and medical informed consent standards, 
informed consent is not triggered when a medical procedure is “sought, offered, 
or performed.”  Rather, it is triggered when a patient presents with a medical
condition for which there are a number of treatment options. 
For example, in Cobbs v. Grant, Cobbs had a duodenal ulcer.139  Dr.  
Grant advised Cobbs he needed surgery.140 Dr. Grant explained the nature
of the surgery but did not inform Cobbs of the inherent risks of the surgery 
nor of the other treatment options.141 Cobbs suffered surgical complications,
resulting in the removal of his spleen and half of his stomach.142 Cobbs 
sued Dr. Grant for medical malpractice, alleging he did not provide informed 
consent to undergo the surgery.143 
The California Supreme Court held that physicians have a duty to disclose
all available treatment options and “the dangers inherently and potentially 
involved in each” one.144 The court reasoned that patients have the right
to control their own bodies and decide for themselves whether or not to
submit to one treatment or another.145 “To enable the patient to chart his
course knowledgably,” the physician must inform the patient of the various 
139. 502 P.2d 1, 4 (Cal. 1972). “Together with companion decisions in other
jurisdictions, [Cobbs] is one of the epochal opinions in the legal recognition of the medical 
patient’s protect[a]ble interest in autonomous decisionmaking.”  Arato v. Avedon, 858 
P.2d 598, 605 (Cal. 1993) (citation omitted).  Cobbs built upon several out-of-state decisions 
contouring the scope of informed consent.  Id. at 604 n.5 (first citing Canterbury v. Spence, 
464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972); then citing Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093 (Kan. 1960);
and then citing Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914)).  For a 
description of the origin and development of the informed consent doctrine, see generally 
Thor v. Superior Court, 855 P.2d 375 (Cal. 1993). 
140. Cobbs, 502 P.2d at 4. 
141. Id.
142. Id. at 4–5. 
143. Id. at 5. 
144. Id. at 10; see also Martha Swartz, Physician-Patient Communication and the 
First Amendment After Sorrell, 17 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 101, 118–21 (2012) (comparing 
general statutory informed consent requirements, which often go legally unchallenged, to 
statutory informed consent requirements in the abortion context). 
145. Cobbs, 502 P.2d at 10. 
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options.146 It is insufficient for a physician to only advise the patient of the
option the physician prefers.147 
Informed consent should not operate differently in the unintended pregnancy 
context. When a patient presents with an unintended pregnancy, she should
be informed of all her options and the risks associated with each option. It
should not be sufficient for a CPC to only advise her of the option it prefers— 
continuing the pregnancy to term.
That the unintentionally pregnant woman should be informed of all her 
options is espoused in nationally-recognized healthcare guidelines.  In its 
Guidelines for Women’s Health Care, the American College of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists recommends that all women experiencing unintended 
pregnancy “should be counseled about their options: continuing the pregnancy 
to term and raising the infant, continuing the pregnancy to term and placing
the infant for legal adoption, or terminating the pregnancy.”148  Likewise,
the federal government requires Title-X-participating projects to counsel 
pregnant women regarding each of the following options: prenatal care and 
delivery; infant care, foster care, or adoption; and pregnancy termination.149 
The information about these options is to be provided in a neutral, factual,
and nondirective way.150 
Indeed, requiring the unintentionally pregnant woman to request a medical
procedure in order to learn about abortion—and how to financially access
abortion—is a catch-22 because continuing a pregnancy to term is not itself 
a medical procedure. But continuing a pregnancy to term certainly implicates 
health risks that ought to be compared to those of abortion. For one, the 
risk of death associated with childbirth is fourteen times higher than the
146. Id. “The scope of the physician’s communications to the patient . . . must be 
measured by the patient’s need, and that need is whatever information is material to the 
decision.  Thus[,] the test for determining whether a potential peril must be divulged is its 
materiality to the patient’s decision.”  Id. at 11 (citing Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 
786 (D.C. Cir. 1972)). 
147. See id. at 10. “In many instances, to the physician, whose training and experience 
enable a self-satisfying evaluation, the particular treatment which should be undertaken may 
seem evident, but it is the prerogative of the patient, not the physician, to determine for himself 
the direction in which he believes his interests lie.”  Id. 
148. Kinsey Hasstedt, Unbiased Information on and Referral for All Pregnancy Options 
Are Essential to Informed Consent in Reproductive Health Care, 21 GUTTMACHER POL’Y 
REV. 1, 2 (2018), https://www.guttmacher.org/sites/default/files/article_files/gpr2100118.
pdf [https://perma.cc/L3L3-ELRR] (quoting AM. COLL. OF OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS, 
GUIDELINES FOR WOMEN’S HEALTH CARE:ARESOURCE MANUAL (4th ed. 2014)). The American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists is “the specialty’s premier professional membership 
organization dedicated to the improvement of women’s health.”  About Us, AM. COLLEGE
OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS, https://www.acog.org/About-ACOG [https://perma.cc/
ET76-SQDQ].
149. 42 C.F.R. § 59.5(a)(5)(i) (2019). 
150. See id. § 59.5(a)(5)(ii). 
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risk of death associated with abortion.151  And as the Becerra dissent pointed
out, “[P]renatal care often involves testing for anemia, infections, measles, 
chicken pox, genetic disorders, diabetes, pneumonia, urinary tract infections, 
preeclampsia, and hosts of other medical conditions.”152  While abortion
has its own attending health risks in extremely rare circumstances153—like
blood clots, bleeding, or infection154—it is considered “one of the safest 
medical procedures out there.”155 Having the health-risk information on
both sides—continuing and terminating a pregnancy—is essential for a 
woman to compare the safety of each option and make an informed, voluntary 
choice—even if some of those options are not medical procedures per se.
In short, the Court did not fit the Licensed Notice into the Casey exception
because it was disseminated to all women in a CPC, regardless of whether
a medical procedure, like abortion, was “sought, offered, or performed.”156 
But the Court could have fit the Licensed Notice into the Casey exception
if it understood informed consent as not necessarily tied to discrete medical 
procedures. Rather, to comport with legal and medical conceptions of 
informed consent, the Court should have understood informed consent as
requiring women to be informed of all options, the risks of each option,
and how to financially access those options. 
151. Elizabeth G. Raymond & David A. Grimes, The Comparative Safety of Legal 
Induced Abortion and Childbirth in the United States, 119 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY
215, 215 (2012), http://unmfamilyplanning.pbworks.com/w/file/fetch/119312553/Raymond% 
20et%20al-Comparative%20Safety.pdf [https://perma.cc/555P-6XFB] (“The pregnancy-
associated mortality rate among women who delivered live neonates was 8.8 deaths per 100,000
live births. The mortality rate related to induced abortion was 0.6 deaths per 100,000 abortions.”). 
152. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2386 (2018) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting). 
153. Less than 2% of abortions yield minor complications and less than 0.25% yield 
major complications requiring hospital admission, surgery, or a blood transfusion. Laura 
Kurtzman, Major Complication Rate After Abortion Is Extremely Low, Study Shows, 
U.C.S.F. (Dec. 8, 2014), https://www.ucsf.edu/news/2014/12/121781/major-complication- 
rate-after-abortion-extremely-low-study-shows [https://perma.cc/5KZX-6PVM]. In terms
of major complications, an abortion is as risky as a colonoscopy.  Id.
154. How Safe Is an In-Clinic Abortion?, PLANNED PARENTHOOD, https://www.planned 
parenthood.org/learn/abortion/in-clinic-abortion-procedures/how-safe-is-an-in-clinic-abortion
[https://perma.cc/S89A-7RMB]. 
155. What Facts About Abortion Do I Need to Know?, PLANNED PARENTHOOD, https://
www.plannedparenthood.org/learn/abortion/considering-abortion/what-facts-about-abortion-
do-i-need-know [https://perma.cc/FWT6-9D4U]. 
156. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2373 (majority opinion). 
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V. CONCLUSION
Because the Court did not fit the Licensed Notice into the Zauderer 
exception nor the Casey exception, the Licensed Notice is subject to strict
scrutiny. In light of this high standard,157 the Court held that Plaintiffs 
were likely to succeed on their free speech claim. On remand, the district 
court will almost certainly issue a preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement
of the FACT Act.  And the Act will almost certainly be deemed unconstitutional
in subsequent litigation. Consequently, CPCs will not have to disseminate
the Licensed Notice. This means that women like Donna will remain unaware 
that CPCs are not their only option.
Even if the Court wanted to limit the circumstances under which speech
regulations received diminished scrutiny, it could have done that and protected 
economically disadvantaged women’s right to access reproductive healthcare. 
It could have fit the Licensed Notice into either exception without suppressing 
unpopular ideas or eroding the marketplace of ideas. The Licensed Notice
did not stop CPCs from spreading their message; it provided more information
to the marketplace. But the Court did not take this route. Perhaps this is 
yet another abrogation of women’s constitutional right to access abortion.158 
157. Content-based speech regulations subject to strict scrutiny are presumptively 
unconstitutional.  Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015) (first citing R.A.V.
v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395 (1992); and then citing Simon & Shuster v. N.Y. State 
Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 115, 118 (1991)). 
158. See generally Cheryl E. Amana Burris, Reproductive Rights Under Attack: Can 
the Fundamentals of Roe Survive?, 8 N.C. CENT. U. BIOTECHNOLOGY & PHARMACEUTICAL
L. REV. 1 (2015). 
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